too much of this good. Price discovery, however, is an externality -each active investor pays the full cost of his efforts but captures only a tiny slice of the benefit -so there is no reason to think active investors purchase the optimal amount of price discovery. If the expected real return on U.S. equity is roughly 6.7% and we assume the annual dollar cost of active investing will not increase in the future, society's capitalized cost of price discovery is about 10%
of the current value of the market. Estimates of the equity risk premium in Fama and French (2002) and Graham and Harvey (2005) , however, suggest that the expected real return on the market is substantially below 6.7%. If so, the capitalized cost of price discovery is above 10% of the current market cap.
Moreover, the data imply that the cost of active investing will grow with the aggregate market cap. This expected growth pushes the capitalized cost even higher. Thus, 10% of the current value of the market is a conservative estimate of the capitalized cost of price discovery.
The first step in my analysis, in Section I, is to estimate the allocation of publicly traded U.S. Institutional costs decline over time for two reasons. First, the costs they pay for active and passive investments decline. Second, and more interesting, institutions shift a large portion of their U.S. equity holdings from active to passive over time.
In Section IV, I use data on individual hedge funds to estimate the fees clients pay to invest in U.S. equity-related funds. The average annual hedge fund fee for 1996 to 2007 is a hefty 4.26% of assets, and, because they pay two layers of fees, the average for clients who buy through funds of hedge funds is even higher, 6.52% per year. My analysis of trading costs, in Section V, follows Stoll (1993) . I use data from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to measure the total commissions and marketmaking gains brokers and dealers earn by trading U.S. stocks.
My bottom line is in Section VI. I compare the resources investors actually spend in the U.S.
market -the fees and expenses paid for mutual funds, the investment management costs paid by institutions, the fees paid to hedge funds and funds of funds, and the transaction costs paid by all traderswith what investors would spend if everyone followed a passive strategy. The difference between the actual and passive estimates is the cost of active investors' search for superior returns.
Standardized by the total value of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks, the amount investors spend trying to beat the market is surprisingly stable; the cost is between 61 and 74 basis points in 24 of the 27 years from 1980 to 2006 and in every year after 1990. Although the total amount is relatively constant, the components change a lot over time. Because the amount invested in mutual funds increases so much through time, for example, the expenditures on fund fees and expenses increase from 0.11% of total market cap in 1980 to 0.32% in 2006. The fees for U.S. equity-related hedge fund investments also grow a lot, from essentially zero early in the period to 0.13% of the total value of U.S. equity in 2006.
These increases are offset by a dramatic drop in the cost of trading. Despite a sharp increase in trading volume, the aggregate cost of trading U.S. equity falls from 0.55% of total market cap in 1980 to only 0.21% in 2006. Thus, measured relative to the value of U.S. equity, investors shift their expenditures from trading to asset management, but the total amount spent to beat the market is never far from the 1980 to 2006 average of 67 basis points.
My estimate of the resources consumed in the search for superior returns does not include several potentially important costs. Retail brokers, for example, borrow from their customers at below market rates and make margin loans to them at above market rates. Although the income from these activities is part of the revenue firms earn for trading -and part of their customers' cost of trading -I miss this in my estimate of the resources investors spend trying to beat the market. Fees for wealth management, such as financial and estate planning, are not a cost of active investing, but my estimate should include advisor fees that are for advice about undervalued stocks and winning investment strategies.
I intentionally omit transfers between investors. An active investor, for example, may pay a large market impact cost to trade quickly. If the counterparty is a broker, this trading cost is included in the market-making gains the broker reports to the SEC, and it is in my estimate of the resources society spends to trade. If the counterparty is another investor, however, the market impact cost is just a transfer, reducing one investor's return and increasing another's by the same dollar amount. Thus, it is not a cost to society. Similarly, to a taxable investor choosing between active and passive strategies, the extra tax burden that typically accompanies active trading is a cost. From society's perspective, however, extra taxes are just a transfer, so I do not include them in my estimate of the resources society spends to beat the market.
Most security lending payments are also transfers -one investor pays to borrow the security and the other receives the payment -so they are appropriately excluded from my estimate of the cost of active investing. The trading desk that arranges a security loan, however, typically retains part of the payment as compensation for its services and this does belong in my estimate. Similarly, the interest retail brokers earn lending securities held in street name is part of their compensation for providing trading services.
The results below miss both of these costs.
I overstate the cost of active investing in at least two ways. First, the fees and expenses I measure include manager compensation. Many managers invest in their own funds, so my estimates include payments managers make to themselves. This is not much of a problem for mutual funds since managers own only a small fraction of aggregate fund assets, but it may be significant for hedge funds.
More important, I assume most investors switch to a market portfolio in the passive scenario.
(Individuals with direct stock holdings and employee stock ownership plans continue to hold their actual portfolios.) There are several reasons, however, why passive investors might choose something other than a market portfolio. Taxable investors have an incentive to avoid realizing short-term gains and to defer long-term gains. Investors with specific social concerns might favor some securities over others.
And, in the spirit of Merton (1973) or Ross (1976) , some investors might shift away from the market portfolio because they prefer a different multifactor risk-return trade-off. To the extent that such deviations from the market portfolio increase the cost of investing in the passive scenario, I overstate the incremental cost of active investing.
Finally, I focus on the monetary cost of active investing, but most active investors bear a second cost: their portfolios are not as well diversified as the market portfolio. The fact that the average investor could increase his return and lower his risk simply by switching to a passive market portfolio raises an obvious question. Why do active investors continue to play a negative sum game? I summarize the paper and address this question in Section VII. An extensive Data Appendix completes the paper. Table I Reserve Board's Flow of Funds Accounts, which reports the total amount of corporate equity held by various investor groups. The adjustments I make to convert these estimates to the allocations in Table I are described in the Data Appendix.
I. Allocations
There are several interesting patterns in the allocations in The Fed's allocations include not only the U.S. equity I focus on, but also foreign equity owned by U.S. residents and institutions. Table I reports the value of these foreign holdings as a fraction of U.S.
investors' total equity portfolio. Readers familiar with the literature seeking to explain why investors do not diversify internationally (e.g., French and Poterba (1991) , Karolyi and Stulz (2003) , and Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004) ) may be surprised that this fraction grows from 2.0% in 1980 and 8.5% in 1990 to a substantial 27.2% in 2007. Thus, in 2007 more than one-fourth of the average U.S. investor's equity portfolio is in foreign stocks. Table I imply.
The allocation to defined contribution plans in Table I remains close to 4% throughout the period, but this is a bit misleading. To avoid double counting, the allocations to defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) plans in Table I do not include the mutual funds they own. The omission has only a modest impact on the estimates for DB plans, but it has a big impact on the estimates for DC plans.
Supplemental data in the Flow of Funds Accounts imply that the mutual fund holdings of DC plans grow from 0.3% of the value of the U.S. market in 1985 to a substantial 8.5% in 2006. Although these estimates include fixed income and foreign equity funds, it is clear that by 2006 DC plans own much more U.S. equity than the 3.8% allocation in Table I suggests.
Finally, in terms of their net holdings of U.S. equity, hedge funds are relatively unimportant.
They grow from 0.3% of U.S. equity in 1990 to 2.2% in 2007. But we shall see that hedge funds play a big role when we look at costs.
II. Average Fees and Expenses for Mutual Funds
My estimates of the resources spent trying to beat the market combine the allocations to various groups, in Table I Table II weight funds by their assets under management at the beginning of the year, and include only those that invest predominantly in U.S. common equity. (The Data Appendix describes the steps used to identify U.S. equity funds. Fama and French (2008) analyze the returns on this set of funds.)
The 
III. Institutional Costs
The information I use to measure the investment expenses of institutional investors comes from two sources. CEM Benchmarking, Inc., a Toronto-based firm that monitors the investment activities of pension plan sponsors, provided annual estimates of the costs incurred by defined benefit and defined contribution plans when they make active and passive investments in the U.S. stock market. I combine these with estimates of the active and passive U.S. equity allocations of institutional investors from Greenwich Associates.
The Greenwich estimates are from surveys of defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, public funds, and nonprofits, which include foundations and endowments through 1999 and only endowments thereafter. Greenwich has conducted surveys annually since 1986 and the respondents control a substantial portion of all institutional investments. For example, 1,950 institutions with more than six trillion dollars participated in the 2006 survey.
The results of the Greenwich surveys are in The estimated costs for all four institutional groups in Table III decline between 1986 and 2006.
The smallest drop is for DB plans, from 34 to 26 basis points. The cost for each of the other three groups declines by 12 or 13 basis points -from 50 to 37 basis points for DC plans, from 32 to 19 basis points for public funds, and from 39 to 27 basis points for nonprofits. These reductions are the result of the decline in the costs of active and passive strategies and, more important, the shift over time from active to passive investments. This shift toward passive strategies is in sharp contrast to the contemporaneous growth of hedge funds, examined next.
IV. Hedge Fund Fees
Hedge fund fees often have two components. A fee of "2 and 20," for example, means that investors pay an annual management fee of 2% of the assets in the fund plus a performance fee of 20% of profits. Because of the performance fee, the aggregate compensation paid to hedge fund managers each year depends on the specific return earned by each fund in the industry. I use data from Hedge Fund
Research (HFR) to estimate the fees on individual hedge funds and funds of hedge funds from May 1996
to December 2007.
Hedge funds trade stocks, bonds, currencies, and other securities in markets around the world.
Since I am measuring the resources spent trying to beat the U.S. stock market, I have to estimate the fraction of hedge fund assets used in U.S. equity strategies. HFR assigns hedge funds to one of several categories, such as merger arbitrage, event driven, and sector funds. I use their categories to sort funds into three groups. I assume funds in the first group use 100% of their assets for equity strategies, those in the second use 50%, and those in the third do not use any of their assets for equity trading. I then use the weight of the U.S. in the world equity portfolio to estimate the fraction of equity-related assets used for trading in the U.S. (The Data Appendix describes this process in detail.) Table IV billion dollars -about 45% of all hedge fund assets -are invested in funds of funds. The HFR database puts all funds of funds in the same category, so I am unable to isolate those that focus on U.S. equityrelated strategies. In the analysis below I assume that funds of funds are invested proportionately between hedge funds that are related to U.S. equity and those that are not. Table IV also reports annual value-weight averages of the fees for funds of funds and U.S. equityrelated hedge funds for 1996 to 2007. Quoted hedge fund fees increase over the sample period. The value-weight average management fee rises from 0.92% in 1996 to 1.28% in 2007, and the average quoted performance fee rises from 18.24% to 19.15% over the same period. There is less variation in the average management fee for funds of funds, but their average quoted performance fee declines a lot over time, from 9.45% in 1996 and 11.41% in 1998 to 6.94% in 2007.
The often mentioned "2 and 20" overstates the typical hedge fund fee. In 2007, for example, the value-weight average management fee is 1.28%, not 2%, and the value-weight average quoted performance fee is 19.15%, not 20%. (These averages do not change much if I use all funds, not just U.S.
equity-related assets.) The standard "1 and 10" is a better description of the average management fee for funds of funds, but it overstates the average quoted performance fee by about 3% after 2001.
2 Because hedge funds use leverage and take long and short positions, the total assets in U.S. equity-related strategies, in Table IV , differ from the net holdings of U.S. equity implied by the allocations in Table I . The Data Appendix explains how I calculate the estimates in both tables.
How much do hedge fund investors pay to beat the market? Averaging over the annual valueweight averages for 1996 to 2007, the typical investor in U.S. equity-related hedge funds pays a management fee of 1.16% of assets and a realized performance fee of 3.11%. Equivalently, the hedge fund industry must generate average annual abnormal returns of 4.26% over this period for the typical investor to break even. The average performance fee is extraordinarily high in two of the first four years of the sample, 5.40% in 1997 and 5.91% in 1999. If we focus on the results for 2000 to 2007, the average drops a bit, but investors still pay an annual combined fee of 3.69% over this eight-year period.
Hedge fund clients who invest through funds of funds pay two layers of fees. Averaging over the annual averages for 1996 to 2007, the typical fund of fund investor pays 2.26% in fund of fund fees and 4.26% in hedge fund fees. Thus, the underlying hedge funds must generate an average abnormal annual return of 6.52% for him to break even. If we throw out the first four years, the averages are lower -1.78% for the fund of fund fee and 5.47% for the total fee -but the threshold for investor success is still high.
3
These estimates include only hedge fund and fund of fund fees. Among other things, they ignore the legal expenses, accounting and auditing fees, custody costs, and board fees that are paid by the funds.
Although I am not able to measure these costs for hedge funds, I can use data from CRSP to infer the cost of comparable services for mutual funds. Specifically, the cost is the difference between a mutual fund's reported expense ratio and the sum of its management and 12b-1 fees, which are both available in the CRSP database after 2000. The average of the annual value-weight averages for U.S. equity mutual funds for 2001 to 2006 is 21 basis points.
My estimates of hedge fund costs also miss most of the payments they make to their prime brokers. These include financing costs, security lending fees, and charges for settling transactions done at other brokers. I do, however, capture the trading costs of hedge funds in the estimates I discuss next.
3 Brown, Goetzmann, and Liang (2004) use the TASS hedge fund database to estimate realized performance fees for 1995 to 2003, and their annual average is higher than mine in six of the eight years our periods overlap.
V. Trading Costs
Stoll (1993) develops a simple way to measure the aggregate cost of trading. The total commissions, bid-ask spreads, and other costs investors pay for trading services must equal the total revenue brokers and dealers receive for those services. As Stoll (1993) shows, one can measure this revenue with information from the Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single (FOCUS) reports that registered securities firms must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission each year.
The trading revenue in the FOCUS reports includes commissions, which firms earn when they facilitate agency trades as a broker, and the gains or losses firms earn from market making. The process I use to extract this information, which is described in the Data Appendix, is almost identical to that used in Stoll (1993) .
The FOCUS reports do not allow me to estimate three important components of trading revenue.
Firms trading for retail investors are able to borrow money from clients at below market rates (typically through cash sweep accounts), make margin loans to clients at above market rates, and earn revenue by lending securities held in street name, including those in margin accounts.
Consider Of course, this revenue is not free. In a competitive market, it is simply part of the compensation Schwab and other firms receive for providing brokerage services. This revenue and the revenue retail brokers earn by lending securities held in street name belong in my estimates of the total cost of trading.
Unfortunately, I cannot isolate this income in the FOCUS data and few firms provide Schwab's level of detail in their financial statements. As a result, the revenue is missing from my estimates of trading costs.
Before turning to the estimates of cost, it is useful to look at the amount of trading investors do each year. Figure 1 There are four components: the fees and expenses paid by those who purchase open-end funds, closedend funds, and exchange-traded funds; investment management costs paid by institutions; fees paid by hedge fund investors; and trading costs paid by all investors. To make the costs easier to interpret, I
VI. The Cost of Trying to Beat the Market
standardize each year's dollar cost by the average capitalization of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks during the year. The components of the standardized cost are in Figure 2 .
A. The Total Cost of Investing
The average of the total standardized costs for 1980 to 2006, in Table VI, There is a much larger drop in the standardized cost of trading. Investors spend 0.55% of the value of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks to trade in 1980 and only 0.21% in 2006 (Table VI) . Thus, during a 26-year period in which annual turnover grows from 42% to 173%, the trading revenue of brokers and dealers declines from about two-thirds of society's total cost of investing to less than onethird.
Much of the decline in trading costs is offset by an increase in the cost of mutual funds. Driven
mostly by falling open-end loads, the value-weight average cost per dollar invested in U.S. equity funds, in period. Because of their large allocation, the management costs institutions incur have a big impact on the total resources society spends to invest. Per dollar invested, the value-weight average cost for institutions is always much lower than the average fees and expenses of mutual funds (Table VI) . (I use the costs of the four groups in 1986 to compute the value-weight average for institutions in 1980 to 1985.)
The biggest difference is in 1981, when the value-weight average cost is 2.25% for funds and only 0.33% for institutions. Although institutional costs do not fall as quickly as fund costs, the shift by institutions toward passive equity strategies and the reduction in the costs institutions pay for both active and passive investments (Table III) (Table IV) . The standardized cost is equally impressive. Fees on U.S. equity-related hedge fund assets, in Table VI 
B. The Cost of Investing if Everyone Is Passive
Passive investors incur some costs. Thus, the incremental cost of active investing is the difference between society's total cost, in Moreover, most flows from mutual fund clients would cross at the fund level, without any need for trading. Although a lower passive turnover may be appropriate, the 10% assumption is conservative because it pushes up the estimated cost of passive investing and lowers my estimate of the resources investors spend to beat the market.
The results of these calculations are in Table VII . The components of society's cost of investing in the passive scenario are muted versions of the actual costs in Table VI . Because of the shift from direct holdings to mutual funds (Table I) , the standardized cost of mutual funds increases from 1.1 basis points in 1980 to 6.5 basis points in 2006. The 60% reduction in the institutional cost of passive investing (Table III) and the modest reduction in the allocation to institutions over time (Table VI) 
C. The Cost of Active Investing
We are now ready to answer the central question. is a futile search for superior returns. If we assume that society will continue to spend the current real dollar cost of active investing forever and that the expected real return on the U.S. stock market is a constant 6.7%, the capitalized cost is 10% of the current value of the market. This estimate is conservative. First, the estimates in Fama and French (2002) and Graham and Harvey (2005) suggest that the long-term equity risk premium is far below 6.7%. If so, the expected real return on the market is almost certainly below 6.7%. Second, the data imply that the annual dollar cost of active investing will grow with the aggregate market cap. Positive expected growth and a lower discount rate both push the capitalized cost above 10%. In short, if the social benefit of active investing is price discovery, the annual cost is 0.67% of the aggregate value of the market and the capitalized cost is at least 10% of the value. Finally, the results in Table VII allow The difference between the actual and passive estimates measures the cost of active investing.
The average difference for 1980 to 2006 is 0.67%. Thus, from society's perspective, the average annual cost of price discovery is 0.67% of the total value of domestic equity and the capitalized cost is at least 10% of the current market value. From a typical investor's perspective, the message is more challenging.
If there is no net transfer between a passive market portfolio and other investors, the average annual return on the passive portfolio is 67 basis points higher than the value-weight average of all investors' Whether fund of fund investors break even or not, a passive market portfolio produces a higher return than the aggregate of all active portfolios. Why do active investors continue to play a negative sum game? Perhaps the dominant reason is a general misperception about investment opportunities. Many are unaware that the average active investor would increase his return if he switched to a passive strategy.
Financial firms certainly contribute to this confusion. Although a few occasionally promote index funds as a better alternative, the general message from Wall Street is that active investing is easy and profitable.
This message is reinforced by the financial press, which offers a steady flow of stories about undervalued stocks and successful fund managers.
Overconfidence is probably the other major reason investors are willing to incur the extra fees, expenses, and transaction costs of active strategies. There is evidence that overconfidence leads to active Finally, some investors trade actively because they really are able to produce superior returns.
The existence of superior investors, however, does not explain the behavior of the average investor.
Active investing is still a negative sum game. Every dollar a superior investor earns must increase the aggregate losses of all other active investors.
Data Appendix

A.1. Allocation of Equity
The main source for the allocation of U.S. publicly traded common equity in Table I The direct holdings of households in Table I build on estimates in Kennickell (2003 Kennickell ( , 2006 . He uses information in the Fed's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to measure the amount of publicly traded equity households own directly in 1989 , 1992 , 1995 Although investment costs differ across defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, and ESOPs, the Federal Reserve combines their allocations in Table I does not include ESOPs.
The Federal Reserve's allocations in Table L .213 include the foreign equity held by U.S.
investors. Thus, my next step is to remove these securities by assuming they are held proportionately by all U.S. investors except ESOPs.
The Flow of Funds Accounts do not include a separate allocation to hedge funds. As I describe in Finally, I allocate the U.S. equity holdings of foreign investors proportionately among direct holdings, mutual funds, closed-end funds, ETFs, defined benefit plans, and banks, insurance companies, and broker/dealers. This allocation excludes nonprofits, defined contributions plans, ESOPs, public plans, and state and local governments.
A.2. Mutual Funds
The data used to compute the value-weight average mutual fund fees in Table II are The process I use to infer the nature of a fund's assets from its name is based on a mapping from 977 character strings I identify to 78 investment styles. Municipal bond funds in the CRSP database, for example, typically have "Municipal," "Muni," or "Mu Tr" in their names. Including different capitalizations, I identify 22 strings associated with small cap value and two for small/mid value. This mapping has many exceptions. "High yield," for example, usually signals a bond fund, but not if it is followed by "stock." Similarly, none of the funds with "Barclays Global" in the name are actually global.
The algorithm to interpret fund names has more than 250 overrides for specific cases like these.
I try to determine whether a fund is definitely equity and definitely domestic during each month it is in the database. Sometimes the style codes and fund name contradict each other. The S&P objective code appears to be the most reliable so a definite classification based on this code trumps almost all other information. For example, if the S&P code says a fund is definitely not equity in 2001, I exclude the fund from my calculations for that year. I override the S&P code only if the fund's current name implies its assets are definitely not equity or definitely not domestic. If the S&P code is not available or does not reveal the investment region, I turn to the area code. The Weisenberger code is next, followed by fund name. Finally, I use the policy code for any month in which the fund's region or asset class remains uncertain. In short, I look at a fund's S&P objective code, area code, Weisenberger code, name, and policy code sequentially each month. I include the fund in the sample only if the codes and fund name say that the fund is definitely domestic equity before they say it is definitely not equity or definitely not domestic.
The average mutual expense ratios in Table II weight funds by their assets under management at the beginning of the year. Replacing missing expense ratios with the equal-weight average expense ratio of funds of similar size has a negligible effect on the results.
The calculations used to estimate the average annuitized loads for mutual funds in Table II are from the Investment Company Institute and are described in Rea and Reid (1998) . 7 The averages I use weight funds by their sales. Switching to asset-weight averages increases the average annuitized loadand my estimate of society's cost of trying to beat the market -by an average of one basis point a year.
A.3. Hedge Fund Fees
Hedge fund and fund of fund managers often charge two fees, a management fee that is a fixed percent of current assets and a performance fee that depends on the fund's profits. Funds usually pay the management fee more frequently, but the performance fee is almost always paid only once a year, typically at the end of December. The performance fee may depend on a high water mark or a hurdle rate, which may be a constant, such as 10%, or the return on a financial instrument, such as one-month Treasury bills. To understand how high water marks and hurdle rates affect performance fees, define a fund's adjusted gross return for a year as its gross return minus its management fee. If there is a hurdle rate and no high water mark, the annual performance fee is the maximum of zero and the difference between the current adjusted gross return and the hurdle rate; the fee depends on only this year's return.
A high water mark puts memory in the process. With a high water mark, the annual performance fee for a new investor is the maximum of zero and the difference between the cumulative adjusted gross return since he invested and the cumulative hurdle rate. The annual performance fee for an investor who has paid at least one fee is the maximum of zero and the difference between the cumulative adjusted return since his last performance fee and the cumulative hurdle rate.
Management and performance fees accrue until they are paid. Most funds report their monthly net return, which is the gross return minus the change in the accrued fees for an investor who was in the fund the last time a performance fee was paid. Although the realized performance fee is one-sided -the manager does not contribute money if the fund does poorly -accrued performance fees can be recovered.
Thus, if a fund starts the month with a positive accrued performance fee and then performs poorly, the fund's net return is increased by a reduction in the accrued fee.
Because high water marks make performance fees a function of past returns, they complicate calculations to convert net returns into gross returns and performance fees. Fortunately, the link with past returns is broken when a performance fee is paid. The relations among net returns, gross returns, quoted fees, and actual fees for a fund with a high water mark depend on only the fund's returns since its most recent positive performance fee. In the equations below, I denote the date of that fee as time zero, t = 0, and I assume management fees and performance fees are paid yearly, so each period is one year.
Define M as the fund's annual management fee (for example, 2%) and P as the quoted performance fee (e.g., 20%). Also define H(t) as one plus the hurdle rate for year t, G(t) as one plus the gross return, and G′(t) as the adjusted gross return, 
(t) = N(t-1)*G′(t).
An investor does not pay a performance fee in year t unless the value of his investment before subtracting the fee is above the high water mark. Consider an investor with one dollar in the fund at time t = 0. His high water mark is the compounded hurdle rate,
and HWM(t) = HWM(t-1)*H(t),
and his net return in year t is the adjusted gross return, G(t) -M, minus the performance fee. If the next positive performance fee is in year T, his investment is worth the compounded value of the adjusted gross return, N(t), at the end of each year before T and it is worth N(T) before subtracting the performance fee in T. Thus, for each dollar invested at time 0, the performance fee in year t is P* Max[0, N(t) 
-HWM(t)].
Since his investment is worth N(t-1) at the beginning of year t, the net return for year t is
R(t) = G(t) -M -P*Max[0, N(t) -HWM(t)] / N(t-1) (A2) = G′(t) -P*Max[0, G′(t) -hwm(t)], where hwm(t) = HWM(t) / N(t-1)
is the high water mark at the end of year t relative to the investment at the beginning of t.
I use a sequential process to convert the net returns firms typically report into gross returns and realized performance fees, P*Max [0, G′(t) -hwm(t) ]. I assume each fund has just paid a performance fee when it is added to the database. I then compare the net return and the relative high water mark for each successive year t. If the net return is less than the relative high water mark, the fund did not pay a performance fee and the gross return is the net return plus the management fee. And if the net return is greater than the relative high water mark, the fund did pay a performance fee, the gross return is the net return plus both fees, and I restart the process. The HFR data have several virtues. First, the graveyard database minimizes survival bias.
Second, HFR records the date each fund is added to the databases, so it is easy to avoid backfill bias.
Third, HFR reports details of each fund's fee, including whether there is a high water mark or a hurdle rate and, if there is a hurdle rate, how it is set.
Despite these virtues, the HFR data are not perfect. HFR reports only the most recent fee for each fund. Funds rarely change their quoted fees, however, so this is not a big problem. More important, the fees in the databases are quoted prices, not the contractual fees investors actually pay. Since deals with individual clients are private, this problem afflicts every study of hedge funds, but it may not be severe.
Total assets invested in hedge funds grow rapidly during the last seven years of the sample, from less than The live and graveyard databases report monthly performance and assets under management.
They also report: (i) the current management and performance fees for live funds or the last fees for graveyard funds; (ii) whether the fund has a high water mark; (iii) whether the fund has a hurdle rate and, if so, how the hurdle rate is determined; (iv) whether the reported returns are net of all fees, net of only the management fee, or gross of fees; (v) whether the fund is domiciled outside the U.S.; and (vi) the currency in which the returns and assets under management are denominated.
Since my goal is to estimate the resources spent trying to produce superior returns in the U.S.
stock market, I want to measure only the hedge fund and fund of fund fees paid for U.S. equity-related investments. I use categories assigned by HFR to sort funds into three groups. I assume funds in the first group use 100% of their assets for equity trading strategies, those in the second use 50%, and those in the third do not use any of their assets for equity trading. Table IV, but dropping the 19 funds completely has a negligible effect on my estimates. There are many more funds with missing assets. I do not include a fund until the first month assets are available after the fund is added to the HFR database and I assume assets grow at the fund's reported return when they are missing.
100%
HFR uses all three of its databases to measure total assets in each category and the hedge fund assets in Table IV are based on these estimates. To estimate the U.S. equity-related fund of fund assets in Table IV , I multiply total fund of fund assets by the ratio of U.S. equity-related hedge fund assets relative to all hedge fund assets. The fees in Table IV are averages of the value-weight average for each category.
Thus, I use individual fund data to compute the value-weight average for each category, then I weight each average by the category's total beginning-of-year assets times the fraction of its assets in U.S. equity-related strategies.
A.4. Trading Costs
Registered securities firms must file Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single (FOCUS) reports with the SEC each year. These reports contain detailed financial statements, including information about the revenue firms earn by trading. I use aggregate values of these data, from the SEC, to estimate the exchange commissions, over-the-counter (OTC) commissions, and trading gains in Table   V . The process I use is almost identical to the process in Stoll (1993) . I make three adjustments to the data in Table A1 . First, the exchange and OTC commissions for equity trades include the commissions, clearing fees, and floor brokerage fees that one securities firm pays to another. These transactions are transfers, rather than an additional cost of trading, so they should be eliminated from reported commissions. The FOCUS reports show the total value of transfers between firms, but there is not a separate line for just U.S. equity transactions. Thus, to eliminate the transfers, I
follow Stoll (1993) and assume the transfers for each group of trades are proportional to the commissions for those trades. For example, I reduce exchange commissions by the total value of the transfers times the ratio of exchange commissions to total commissions. Second, the FOCUS reports pool many equity commissions with commissions from other sources. The "Other" line includes all commissions except (i) those for listed options and listed equity (Part II firms), or (ii) those for listed options and listed equity traded on an exchange (Part IIA firms). I use Stoll's (1993) estimate that 90% of these "Other" commissions are for trading equity. Third, the market-making gains for Part IIA firms include all trading gains except those from market making in options on an exchange. I follow Stoll (1993) Assets Invested are in billions of dollars and are measured at the beginning of the year. The total for All Hedge Funds is from Hedge Fund Research (HFR). I use HFR's categorization of funds and the U.S. weight among all developed equity markets to estimate the U.S. Equity-related Hedge Fund assets. The estimate of U.S. Equity-related Fund of Fund assets assumes funds of funds invest proportionately among hedge fund categories. All but the last column of fees are value-weight averages of individual fund fees computed using the HFR database and are in percent. The last column is in billions of dollars. The management fee (Mgmt Fee) is a fixed percent of assets in the fund. The Quoted Performance Fee is a fraction of the fund's profits. The Actual Performance Fee is measured relative to the beginning-of-year assets. The Data Appendix describes how the actual performance fee is computed. Averages of the annual fees (and standard errors) are reported for 1996 to 2007 and 2000 to 2007. The data for 1996 start in May. The management fee and quoted performance fee for 1996 are annualized, but the actual performance fee is not. The Standardized Cost is the total dollar cost of investing divided by the aggregate Market Cap, which is the average of the 12 beginning-of-month values of all NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. The aggregate Market Cap is in billions of dollars. The contribution of Mutual Funds to the standardized cost is the total percent of U.S. equity in funds, from Table I , (Allocation, in percent) times the value-weight average of the fees and expenses of mutual funds, in Table II (Fees, in basis points) . Similarly, the contribution of Institutions is the sum of their allocations, from Table I , times the average of their investment management costs, from Table III . The contribution of Hedge Funds is the dollar cost of hedge fund and fund of fund fees, in Table IV , divided by total market cap, and the contribution of Trading costs is the dollar cost, in Table V 
